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THE RIGHT TO KNOW AND SCHOOL BOARD
CENSORSHIP OF HIGH SCHOOL BOOK
ACQUISITIONS
In a recent Ohio textbook case,' the Sixth Circuit recognized the
emerging constitutional concept of a "right to know."2 Holding that
a student's right to receive information limited a school board's power
to remove books from his high school library, the court declared the
existence of the right,3 but did not discuss its content. Although the
Sixth Circuit specifically relied upon the right to know in its decision,
the court did not adequately ground the right in the Constitution.4
Thus the right to know remained a concept with little analytic mean-
ing, offering only slight constitutional protection.
Minarcini v. Strongsville City School District5 arose in 1972 after
a high school English teacher proposed the use of Joseph Heller's
Catch-22 and Kurt Vonnegut, Jr.'s God Bless, You, Mr. Rosewater
as texts for the following school year. As in other textbook cases,,
vehement disagreement regarding the merits of the books7 dominated
public discussion by the School Board and a citizen's committee.8
The Board subsequently voted to reject the books as texts and also
Minarcini v. Strongsville City School Dist., 541 F.2d 577 (6th Cir. 1976).
2 See note 44 infra.
3 Minarcini v. Strongsville City School Dist., 541 F.2d 577, 583 (6th Cir. 1976).
The Sixth Circuit did not indicate from which first amendment guarantee the
right to know derived, see text accompanying notes 57-59 infra, nor did it indicate the
extent of protection from the right, see text accompanying notes 46-52 infra. Thus
Minarcini joins the line of cases which do no more than point to the right to know,
without defining or explaining it. See note 44 infra.
541 F.2d 577 (6th Cir. 1976), modifying, 384 F. Supp. 698 (N.D. Ohio 1974).
E.g., Presidents Council, Dist. 25 v. Community School Bd. No. 25, 457 F.2d
289 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 998 (1972); Williams v. Board of Educ., 388 F.
Supp. 93 (S.D.W.Va.), disposition recorded, 530 F.2d 972 (4th Cir. 1975)(nationally
publicized incident in Kanawha County, West Virginia); Grosser v. Woollett, 45 Ohio
Misc. 15, 341 N.E.2d 356 (Ct. of C.P., Cuyahoga County 1974)(arising in same school
system as Minarcini).
I Although the public discussion was over the literary value of the books, at trial
their artistic merit was conceded. 384 F. Supp. at 703-04. See notes 17 and 43 infra.
After approval by the Faculty Textbook Selection Committee the recommenda-
tions were sent to the Director of Secondary Education and to the Citizen's Textbook
Committee. The Citizen's Committee then sent its own proposals to the Director, who
presented the recommendations of both committees to the Educational Program and
Policy Committee of the School Board. Thereafter, the School Board considered the
recommendations of the Director and the three committees before deciding which
books to use in the next school year. 384 F. Supp. at 700.
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to remove them from the high school library Five students then sued
for declaratory and injunctive relief,"0 asserting violation of their first
and fourteenth amendment rights."
, 541 F.2d at 579. A related issue is the school board's authority to censor student
publications, both official school newspapers and unofficial "underground" newspa-
pers. See Nitzberg v. Parks, 525 F.2d 378 (4th Cir. 1975) (school regulations on student
newspapers vague and overbroad); Gambino v. Fairfax County School Dist., 45
U.S.L.W. 2414 (E.D. Va. Feb. 23, 1977) (school board censorship of student newspaper
article concerning birth control violated first amendment); Leibner v. Sharbaugh, 45
U.S.L.W. 2414 (E.D. Va. Feb. 35, 1977 [(sic)] (ruling requiring student newspaper to
conform to journalistic standards of newspapers of general circulation unconstitu-
tional); Note, First Amendment-Prior Restraint-Board of Education Rule Requiring
Submission of Private Student Newspapers Is Unconstitutionally Vague and
Overbroad-Nitzberg v. Parks, 35 Mn. L. REv. 512 (1976); Note, Prior Restraints in
Public High Schools, 82 YALE L. J. 1325 (1973).
" The students, through their parents as next friends, brought suit under 42
U.S.C. § 1983 (1970) (deprivation of civil rights under color of state law or custom) and
28 U.S.C. § 1343(3) (1970)(federal district courts have original jurisdiction of suits
alleging deprivation, under color of state law, of civil rights). Pursuant to FED. R. Civ.
P. 23 the district court certified the class of all students enrolled in schools operated
by the Strongsville City School District, 384 F. Supp. at 708, and the appellate court
affirmed the determination of the class, 541 F.2d at 579.
Although neither of the Minarcini courts discussed the issue, there is a substantial
question whether school board members or school districts are subject to suit under §
1983. School board members may be immune from § 1983 suits, Wood v. Strickland,
420 U.S. 308 (1975) (school board members have qualified immunity from damages
under § 1983; if members knew or should have known they violated student's constitu-
tional rights, or acted with malicious intent, board members are liable). The Supreme
Court recently decided that school districts are more like "political subdivisions" than
"states," and have no eleventh amendment immunity. Mt. Healthy City School Dist.
Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 97 S.Ct. 568, 572-73 (1977). The circuits are split regarding
whether a school district is a "person" within the terms of 42 U.S.C. § 1983; Compare
Singleton v. Vance County Bd. of Educ., 501 F.2d 429 (4th Cir. 1974) (school district
is not a person) with Keckeisen v. Independent School Dist. 612, 509 F.2d 1062 (8th
Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 833 (1975) (school district is a person). The Supreme Court
reserved decision of this issue in the Mt. Healthy case. 97 S.Ct. at 572. See generally
Note, Immunity of Teachers, School Administrators, School Board Members, and
School Districts From Suit Under Section 1983 of the Civil Rights Act, 1976 U. ILL.
L.F. 1129.
" The plaintiffs alleged violation of their rights of "academic freedom, freedom
of speech, due process, and equal protection of the laws." 384 F. Supp. at 700. Two
years after the Minarcini events, the School Board was again attacked for its textbook
decisions. Grosser v. Woollett, 45 Ohio Misc. 15, 341 N.E.2d 356 (Ct. of C.P., Cuyahoga
County, 1974). In Grosser, the Board approved the use of Claude Brown's Manchild
In The Promised Land and Ken Kesey's One Flew Over The Cuckoo's Nest. Several
of the citizens involved in the Minarcini events thereafter went to local courts for an
order enjoining the use of the books. The Court of Common Pleas ruled the books could
be used, but only if the students had written consent from their parents. 341 N.E.2d
at 368.
CENSORSHIP
Without separating the two issues of school board control of text-
book selection and school board removal of library books, the district
court focused on the "editorial judgment"'12 necessary to allocate the
limited resources of a school system. Since the Ohio legislature had
delegated the exercise of this judgment to local school boards,'3 the
only question deemed open by the district court was whether this
particular school board had impermissibly exercised its authority so
as to violate first amendment rights of students.'" The court inter-
preted the plaintiffs' complaint in light of the Board's "editorial judg-
ment" so that a violation of first amendment rights would not merely
entail control by the Board, but arbitrary or capricious exercise of
that control, as charged by the plaintiffs.'" Traditional first amend-
ment notions of censorship were apparently replaced by a considera-
tion more closely related to procedural due process." The district
2 384 F. Supp. at 704. Examining the kind of decisionmaking required, the court
stated that editorial judgment was an "inescapable aspect of operating a school sys-
tem." Id.
," See OHIo REV. CODE ANN. §§ 3329.01-.99 (Page 1972). In particular, id.
§§ 3329.07-.08 (Page 1972) requires that the local school board determine which and
how many textbooks will be required for the coming year, and which textbooks will be
used in the schools under its control. Orno REV. CODE ANN. § 3329.05 (Page 1972)
provides that library books and other non-textbooks need not undergo the rigorous
control procedures that are required for textbooks. The constitutionality of these stat-
utes was conceded at trial. 384 F. Supp. at 705.
" 384 F. Supp. at 705.
, The court stated that the basis of the complaint was the Board's asserted failure
to specify standards and procedures for purchasing textbooks. Thus the court reviewed
'he purchasing procedure as written and applied by the Board. Id. at 705-06.
The concept of arbitrary and capricious action has long been used to express the
procedural, as opposed to the substantive, aspects of the requirement of due process
of law. In Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502, 536 (1934), the Court stated that the
function of the courts is to determine whether the challenged regulation is reasonable,
or whether it is "arbitrary or discriminatory." See also Chas. Wolff Packing Co; v.
Court of Indus. Relations, 262 U.S. 522, 534 (1923) (freedom of contract subject to a
variety of restraints, but "they must not be arbitrary or unreasonable"); Chicago, B.
& Q. Ry. v. Illinois ex. rel. Drainage Comm'rs, 200 U.S. 561, 592 (1906) (validity of
regulation depends upon "the character of the regulation, whether arbitrary or reason-
able"); Barbier v. Connolly, 113 U.S. 27, 31 (1885) ("there should be no arbitrary
deprivation of life or liberty").
" Although speech has never been "absolute, above and beyond control by the
legislature," Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 508 (1951), the first amendment
has traditionally been concerned with the power of a "state to forbid or proscribe
advocacy." Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969). While there have been
exceptions, such as the procedural safeguards placed upon the effort to repress unpro-
tected speech in Freedman v. Maryland, 380 U.S. 51 (1965) (obscenity), the general
emphasis of first amendment analysis has been whether the state has the power to
limit speech at all, not the form or manner of regulation. This is illustrated by the
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court concluded that the Board had not acted arbitrarily, 7 and that
the plaintiffs had not been denied academic freedom or first and
fourteenth amendment rights.
8
On appeal, the Sixth Circuit sharply distinguished textbook selec-
tion from library regulation, and analyzed the two separately. Adopt-
ing the trial court's rationale as to the Board's control of the curricu-
lum, the court of appeals stated that someone must exercise discre-
tion as to textbook selection, and there was no constitutional princi-
ple prohibiting school board officials from doing so."g In addition, the
court found that the facts presented in Minarcini failed to disclose
any due process violation by the Board."0
distinction of protected versus unprotected speech, e.g., Roth v. United States, 354
U.S. 476, 481 (1957) (obscenity); Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572
(1942) (fighting words), and the use of the "clear and present danger" standard for
the regulation of protected speech. See Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969);
Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494 (1951); Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47
(1919). By examining whether the Board's exercise of control was arbitrary, however,
the district court moved from the question of regulation per se to the procedural
question of the manner of regulation.
17 384 IF. Supp. at 706. The district court concluded that the textbook purchasing
procedure was "fair, equitable, and logical," and further found no arbitrary or capri-
cious acts by the Board in administering the procedure. Id.
Since the textbook purchasing issue was essentially procedural, the Minarcini trial
court stated that literary merit had been conceded and that the novels were not on
trial. Id. at 703-04. This was not true of the Grosser proceedings, see note 11 supra,
where the court held that the school board could not exercise its discretion to distribute
books deemed "harmful to juveniles," as defined by OHIo REV. CODE ANN § 2907.01(E)
(Page 1972). The Grosser court concluded that the books One Flew Over the Cuckoo's
Nest and Manchild In The Promised Land
have no literary, artistic, political or scientific value whatso-
ever. . . . The contents of the books were designed by the authors
to appeal to the base instincts of persons and to shock others for the
purpose of effectuating sales of the books.
It is difficult to think of any material, except the hardest of
hardcore pornography that the legislature intended to outlaw if not
such as the subject books. The court does find that each of these books
is offensive. ...
341 N.E.2d 356, 367.
" 384 F. Supp. at 709. The district court also found that the Board issued no
directive "precluding any instructor from discussing any or all of the novels in class or
assigning any such novel as outside reading . . .", id. at 706-07, and dismissed a
portion of the complaint alleging such acts. Id. at 708.
" 541 F.2d at 579.
Id. at 580. The Sixth Circuit interpreted the language of the district court to
refer to procedural due process. An ambiguity exists in the two opinions in the unex-
plained use of the phrase "first and fourteenth amendment rights." The emphasized
words may designate the use of the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment
CENSORSHIP
The Sixth Circuit could not, however, extend this locus-of-
decisionmaking rationale to uphold the Board's removal of books
from the school library. The difference was due to what the Sixth
Circuit termed "the right of students to receive information which
they and their teachers desire them to have."' 2' This right to know
demanded at least a constitutionally neutral explanation for the exer-
cise of the Board's authority.22 None was made, and the court of
appeals reversed the trial court's dismissal of that portion of the
complaint.
The first of the two main issues2 discussed in Minarcini was the
which expands the protection of the first amendment to state action. See Stromberg
v. California, 283 U.S. 359, 368 (1931); Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357,371 (major-
ity), 373 (1927)(Brandeis and Holmes, JJ., concurring), overruled on other grounds,
Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969); Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 666
(1925). Alternatively, the reference to the fourteenth amendment may designate the
requirement that there be fair procedure in the conduct of proceedings affecting legal
rights. See, e.g., Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46, 67 (1947)(Frankfurter, J.,
concurring) ("an exercise of judgment upon the whole course of the proceedings in
order to ascertain whether they offend those canons of decency and fairness which
express the notions of justice of English-speaking peoples"). It was in this latter sense,
apparently, that the Sixth Circuit construed the phrase.
The district court may have intended to include elements of both applications of
the phrase, for after examining the fairness of the procedure the district court discussed
pure first amendment issues under the speech, establishment and exercise clauses. See
384 F. Supp. at 706-07. Applying both the fair procedure requirement and the first
amendment-protective requirement, the court could replace the usual censorship test
of the first amendment, see note 16 supra, with one more procedural in scope. See text
accompanying notes 12-16 supra. To construe the district court's opinion as referring
solely to procedural due process, however, with no influence from substantive first
amendment, concerns, would be to render the trial court's discussion of first amend-
ment issues superfluous.
21 541 F.2d at 583.
Id. at 582. Presumably, the right to know cannot be any more absolute than the
first amendment from which it arises. See note 16 supra. Thus, in some circumstances
the right may be justifiably abridged or restricted, as freedoms of speech ("clear
and present danger," see note 16 supra), press ("actual malice," see New York Times
Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964)), or religion (incidental burdens justified by sub-
stantial government interests, see Gillette v. United States, 401 U.S. 437 (1971)) may
be. Because the right to know does not seem to be an affirmative, enforceable claim,
see text accompanying notes 46-55 infra, the Sixth Circuit did not require a showing
of such special circumstances as other first amendment rights demand, but only an
explanation in neutral terms.
2 A third issue mentioned in the case was the plaintiffs' claim of a violation of
academic freedom. Alleging that the School Board had issued directives prohibiting
any class discussion, or any supplemental use of the books, the plaintiffs contended
that their academic freedom, as protected by the first amendment, had been restricted.
The district court made a factual determination that the Board had not passed' such
a resolution or directive. 384 F. Supp. at 706-07. See note 13 supra. The appellate court
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authority of the school board to overrule a teacher's professional deci-
sion. While there has been recent litigation of this issue,2 the best
analysis2 would seem to be the locus-of-decisionmaking rationale
adopted by both courts in Minarcini. Editorial judgments are inevita-
ble in administering a school system since limitations of time, space,
and finances demand that certain textbooks be selected and others
rejected. 26 Thus the issue is not simply one of censorship. The issue
affirmed this finding, 541 F.2d at 584, and consequently the issue of academic freedom
,was not analyzed.
The Constitution has been invoked by public school students only rarely, and then
usually to challenge statutes or school rules governing the conduct. See Develop-
ments in the Law: Academic Freedom, 81 HARv. L. REv. 1045, 1128 (1968) [herein-
after cited as Developments-Academic Freedom]. The concept of academic freedom
involves the claim that a community of scholars in the pursuit of knowledge should
be immune from ideological coercion. This is based on the assertion that the societal
value to be derived from the scholarly community can be gained only in at atmosphere
free of "administrative, political, or ecclesiastical constraints on thought and expres-
sion." Id. at 1048. In light of the value-inculcative purpose of secondary public educa-
tion, as contrasted with the broader intellectual investigation of the university level
education, see id. at 1154-55 and text accompanying notes 28-33 infra, it would not
appear that the concept would form a sufficient basis for a high school student to
challenge library book acquisition decisions.
The issue of academic freedom has generated much discussion. See, e.g., T. EMER-
SON, THE SYSTEM OF FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION 593-626 (1970); Kutner, The Freedom
of Academic Freedom: A Legal Dilemma, 48 CH.-KENT L. REv. 168 (1971); Van Al-
styne, The Constitutional Rights of Teachers and Professors, 1970 DUKE L.J. 841.
, See Mailloux v. Kiley, 436 F.2d 565 (1st Cir.), after dismissal, 323 F.Supp. 1387
(D. Mass.), aff'd. 448 F.2d 1242 (1st Cir. 1971) (per curiam) (teacher who in good faith
chose teaching method relevant to subject and students, and which could be regarded
as serving serious educational purpose, could not be discharged for using such
method); Keefe v. Geanakos, 418 F.2d 359, 361 (1st Cir. 1969) (teacher may, for demon-
strated educational purposes, quote a "dirty" word); Parducci v. Rutland, 316 F. Supp.
352 (M.D. Ala. 1970) (where public school officials failed to show that assigned short
story was inappropriate or created significant disruption to educational process, dis-
missal of teacher violated first amendment).
2 An outstanding article in the area of school board control of texts is Goldstein,
The Asserted Constitutional Right of Public School Teachers to Determine What They
Teach, 124 U. PA. L. REV. 1293 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Goldstein]. Professor
Goldstein supports the locus-of-decisionmaking rationale with a careful analysis of the
values and purposes of prescriptive, secondary education. See text accompanying note
29 infra. See generally Goldstein, The Scope and Sources of School Board Authority
to Regulate Student Conduct and Status: A Nonconstitutional Analysis, 117 U. PA.
L. REV. 373 (1969); Nahmod, Controversy in the Classroom: The High School Teacher
and Freedom of Expression, 39 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1032 (1971); Nahmod, First
Amendment Protection for Leaning and Teaching: The Scope of Judicial Review, 18
WAYNE L. REV. 1479 (1972); Project-Education and the Law: State Interests and
Individual Rights, 74 MIcH. L. REv. 373 (1976).
1, 384 F. Supp. at 704. See note 12 supra.
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is whether the teacher or the elected school board should exercise the
necessary judgment.Y
The function of secondary school education, as contrasted with
university level education, is significant in making this determina-
tion. The goal of secondary education is to inculcate certain preferred
values in the students,2 and may be termed "prescriptive." In con-
trast, university level students are encouraged to examine all values
and ideas; their education is "analytic," that is, learning in a market-
place of diverse, competing ideas." The determination of which ideas
are socially preferred, and thus are to be taught in public secondary
schools, is a predominantly political decision. As such, the determi-
nation is best left to the political mechanisms of the state govern-
ment .3 The state may choose to delegate the decision to local, elected
school boards, 32 as arbiters of community values, but individual
teachers should not be allowed to overrule the decisions "of society."
Beyond this political analysis, the right of a teacher to vary the
determinations of the school board would appear to be constricted by
the employer-employee relation between the board and the teacher.
This is demonstrated by two facets of the claim of the teacher' to
2 See Goldstein, supra note 25, at 1334.
21 The District Court of Massachusetts in Mailloux v. Kiley, 323 F. Supp. 1387
(D. Mass. 1971), noted the difference between secondary and higher education, stating
that
members of the community usually expect the secondary school to
concentrate on transmitting basic information, teaching "the best
that is known and thought in the world," training by established
techniques, and, to some extent at least, indoctrinating in the mores
of the surrounding society. While secondary schools are not rigid disci-
plinary institutions, neither are they open forums in which mature
adults, already habituated to social restraints, exchange ideas on a
level of parity.
Id. at 1392. See also Developments-Academic Freedom, supra note 23,'at 1050, 1098.
" The terms "analytic" and "prescriptive" were used by Professor Goldstein in
examining student rights. See Goldstein, Reflections on Developing Trends In The Law
Of Student Rights, 118 U. PA. L. REv. 612, 614 (1970).
See Goldstein, supra note 25, at 1297.
21 While teachers are highly trained and educated, they are still not suited to
resolve such political questions.
Such judgments [as to what should be taught] are not of the type
which the prior training and experience of teachers have uniquely
equipped them to answer definitively for society, either as individual
teachers or as an organizdd faculty or profession. These are truly polit-
ical questions that should be determined by instruments of societal
will rather than by professional experts.
Goldstein, supra note 25, at 1337-38 (footnote omitted).
22 E.g., OHfo REv. CODE ANN. §§ 3329.07-.08 (Page 1972).
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determine what materials will be used. If selection of textbooks is
viewed as a duty of employment, then the teacher's claim would be
that he is free of the normal power of the employer to control the
actions of the employee within the scope of employment2 3 Alterna-
tively, if selection of textbooks is viewed as an exercise of protected
speech, then the claim would be that the teacher is not merely to be
free of unconstitutional conditioning 4 of his right to speech, but is to
be paid for exercising that right. In short, the teacher demands subsi-
dized speech rather than speech free of interference. 5 Neither of these
claims seems fully tenable.
The political nature of the textbook decision and the restrictive
nature of the employment relationship furnish ample reason why the
authority to select textbooks should rest finally with the school board
and not with the teacher. The trial court recognized these considera-
tions,3 and the Sixth Circuit adopted the same rationale.37 The Sixth
Circuit did not apply this reasoning, however, to the second main
issue, that of library book regulation. The difference in result was due
to the putative right to know, to read books, and to receive informa-
tion. The prescriptive/analytic distinction that may be drawn from
the functions of secondary and higher education 38 may also be applied
to the different functions of the classroom and the library. Within the
secondary school, the library serves a more analytic purpose while the
classroom is the center of the prescriptive, value-inculcative effort.
Thus a denial of access to books and ideas would be manifestly more
serious in the library than in the classroom. Consequently, the
Sixth Circuit accepted the School Board's general decisionmaking
authority as final in the classroom,39 but stated that the exercise of
this authority over the library might curtail freedom of speech and
thought, and should be carefully limited."
For the district court, the necessary process of book selection did
not in itself violate first amendment rights unless it was shown to
have been carried out unfairly." This approach would place upon the
I See Goldstein, supra note 25, at 1337. Goldstein points out the difference be-
tween the "archetypal professional" and a salaried employee, whose method and man-
ner of performance may be regulated by the employer.
3* See note 51 infra.
See Goldstein, supra note 25, at 1340-41.
31 384 F. Supp. at 708-09.
11 541 F.2d at 579-81.
11 See text accompanying note 28 supra.
3 541 F.2d at 579-80.
" Id. at 581.
" 384 F. Supp. at 706. The district judge wrote that "ideological conflicts" would
go through "peaceful transition" in a classical dialectic of thesis-antithesis-synthesis,
CENSORSHIP
plaintiffs the burden of showing an impermissible restriction of first
amendment freedoms. The Sixth Circuit, however, rested its decision
on an undefined right of access to books and ideas arising from the
first amendment. Given this right, any removal of books would ap-
pear to violate first amendment protections unless explained in con-
stitutionally neutral terms.2 Thus the Sixth Circuit's approach
places upon the defendant School Board the burden of justifying the
exercise of its discretion to tailor the content of library acquisitions.
In Minarcini the Board gave no justification, although some evidence
pointed to personal displeasure of the Board members as the impetus
for removing the books.13 Therefore, the court of appeals reversed the
trial court's dismissal of the library book acquisition issue.
Although the Sixth Circuit relied specifically upon a right to re-
ceive information, it did not discuss the content or the extent of this
ill-defined concept.4 While examining the way in which the protec-
and the only role of the courts in this process would be to insure equal protection of
the law and freedom from capricious action or abuse of authority by any participant.
Id. at 704. Then, quoting from Presidents Council, Dist. 25 v. Community School Bd.
No. 25, 457 F.2d 289, 293 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 998 (1972), the Minarcini
district court held that "to suggest that the shelving or unshelving of books presents a
constitutional issue, particularly where there is no showing of a curtailment of freedom
of speech or thought, is a proposition we cannot accept." 384 F. Supp. at 705.
11 By use of the phrase "neutral in First Amendment terms," the Sixth Circuit
recognized that there may be a number of reasons for the action of the Board. Some
of these purposes would be permissible, while some would violate the rights of the
students. The Sixth Circuit required only that the School Board give some valid reason
for its action, a purpose that would not infringe the Constitution. 541 F.2d at 582.
" The only evidence as to the reason for the School Board's book removal was the
minority report of the Citizen's Committee, characterizing Mr. Rosewater as
"completely sick" and "garbage." Id. at 581. In place of Mr. Rosewater, the minority
report recommended the use of "the autobiography of Captain Eddie Rickenbacker."
Id. Recognizing the weakness of relying on a minority report, the Sixth Circuit never-
theless stated that it was "the only official clue," and termed the Board's silence
"extraordinary in view of the intense community controversy." Id. at 582.
U The right to know or to receive information had its genesis in Martin v. City of
Struthers, 319 U.S. 141 (1943). The Court there held a municipal ordinance forbidding
door-to-door distribution of handbills violative of first amendment rights of speech
because it substituted the community's judgment for the individual's as to what ma-
terial was annoying. The Supreme Court recognized that "[tihe right of freedom of
speech and press has broad scope. . . . This freedom embraces the right to distribute
literature, [citation omitted] and necessarily protects the right to receive it." Id. at
143. Although the right to know had been mentioned and relied upon in subsequent
cases, it has never been adequately discussed or grounded in the Constitution. See
Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Coun., Inc., 425 U.S.
748, 757 (1976) ("If there is a right to advertise, there is a reciprocal right to receive
the advertising..."); Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 809, 829 (1975) ("The policy of the
First Amendment favors dissemination of information and opinion"); Procunier v.
1977] 1123
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tion from this right was developed in Minarcini offers some under-
standing of the scope of the right, even after the decision there remain
weaknesses in the definition of this asserted constitutional right.4 5
The most important issue still unresolved is the substance of the
supposed right. In its most limited sense, the right to know may be
no more than a grant of standing to listeners to challenge the denial
of a speaker's right of speech. 8 The right to know encompassed more
than this in Minarcini, however, for the students were asserting a
claim of access, in a particular facility, to the books involved. Never-
theless, it would seem undesirable to interpret the right to receive
information so broadly as to be an enforceable claim, for this would
mean that a student, under the aegis of the right to know, could force
the school library to purchase and place into circulation requested
books. But the editorial judgment necessary to maintain classroom
education is also essential to maintain a school library. The question
here is whether there is a constitutional right that may sometimes
override that editorial judgment. As between the student and the
Martinez, 416 U.S. 396, 408 (1974) ("censorship of the communication between
[parties] . . . necessarily impinges on the interests of each. Whatever the status of a
prisoner's claim to uncensored correspondence with an outsider, it is plain that the
latter's interest is grounded in the First Amendment's guarantee of freedom of
speech"); Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753, 763 (1972); Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S.
557, 564 (1969) ("[The] right to receive information and ideas, regardless of their
social worth, [citation ommitted] is fundamental to our free society"); Red Lion
Broadcasting Co. v. Federal Communications Comm'n, 395 U.S. 367, 390 (1969) ("It
is the right of the public to receive suitable access to social, political, esthetic, moral,
and other ideas and experiences which is crucial here"); Lamont v. Postmaster Gen.,
381 U.S. 301, 305 (1965) (regulation allowing delivery of foreign communist propa-
ganda mailing only upon addressee's affirmative written request unconstitutional be-
cause it limited "the unfettered exercise of the addressee's First Amendment rights");
Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 534 (1945) ("that there was a restriction upon...
the rights of the workers to hear what he [Thomas] had to say, there can be no
doubt").
11 For a general discussion of the right to know, and associated concepts, see
Emerson, Legal Foundations Of The Right To Know, 1976 WASH. U.L.Q. 1; Henkin,
The Right To Know And The Duty To Withhold: The Case Of The Pentagon Papers,
120 U. PA. L. REv. 271 (1971); O'Neil, Libraries, Librarians And First Amendment
Freedoms, 4 HuMAN RIGHTS 295 (1975); Steel, Freedom To Hear: A Political Justifica-
tion Of The First Amendment, 46 WASH. L. REv. 311 (1971) [hereinafter cited as
Steel].
1' Several cases have allowed potential listeners to challenge statutes or institu-
tional decisions denying invited guests the opportunity to speak at state institutions.
Traditionally this would be seen as the speaker's cause of action, not the listener's,
but the speakers did not sue in these cases. See Brooks v. Auburn Univ., 412 F.2d 1171
(5th Cir. 1969); Smith v. University of Tenn., 300 F. Supp. 777 (E.D. Tenn. 1969);
Snyder v. Trustees of U. of Ill., 286 F. Supp. 927 (N.D. Ill. 1968).
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The Sixth Circuit gave to the right to know an intermediate sta-
tus, which may be characterized as that of a constitutionally-
protected interest rather than of an affirmative right." The court of
appeals described the library as a privilege created by the state for
the benefit of the students,49 thus preventing students from enforcing
claims for access to books not yet possessed by the library, and barred
the school board from withdrawing books already in circulation ex-
cept for good reason. Because the library was a privilege, neither the
state nor the School Board was under any duty to provide a library,
or any particular book. Also, because the library was a benefit or
" The presence of the professional librarian demonstrates the difficulty of the
situation under consideration. A conflict between the school librarian and the school
board as to what books to place in circulation may be analogized to the teacher/school
board conflict over texts. Again because of the prescriptive purpose of secondary edu-
cation, see note 28 supra, and thus the political nature of the decision, see note 31
supra, the resolution of the conflict should favor the school board. In the posited
librarian/student disagreement, the decisionmaking authority clearly should reside
with the librarian because of his professional training. However, the question in
Minarcini was whether the student could dispute the determinations of the school
board, and if so, then to what extent.
The right/interest distinction was used by the District Court of Massachusetts
in discussing the teacher's asserted right to determine teaching method. The court
stated that:
The so-called constitutional right is not absolute. It is akin to, and
may indeed be a species of, the right of freedom of speech which is
embraced by the concept of the "liberty" protected by the Fourteenth
Amendment. Analytically, as distinguished from rhetorically, it is less
a right than a constitutionally-recognized interest. Clearly, the
teacher's right must yield to compelling public interests of greater
constitutional significance.
Mailloux v. Kiley, 436 F.2d 565 (1st Cir.), after dismissal, 323 F. Supp. 1387, 1391 n.4
(D. Mass.), af'd, 448 F.2d 1242 (1st Cir. 1971) (per curiam).
The usual forum in which the right/interest distinction appears is the equal pro-
tection case, where the level of the interest determines the judicial scrutiny of the
challenged classification. Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 375-76 (1971); Shapiro
v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 634 (1969). Those restrictions which infringe fundamental
rights or liberties are examined with "strict scrutiny," and a compelling state interest
must be shown to justify the restriction. San Antonio Independent School Dist. v.
Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 29 (1973); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 634 (1969).
Restrictions which infringe upon interests not "explicitly or implicitly guaranteed by
the Constitution," and thus not fundamental rights, may be justified merely by show-
ing a rational basis for the classification. San Antonio Independent School Dist. v.
Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 33 (1973).
" 541 F.2d at 581.
Id. at 582.
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privilege, the court could apply an analysis similar to the doctrine of
unconstitutional conditions5 to hold that the Board could not condi-
tion the use of the library upon terms related solely to the personal
tastes of Board members.- Removal of the books would constitute a
condition on or withdrawal of the privilege of the library, and could
only be undertaken for reasons which were neutral in terms of the first
amendment.
In response to the possible contention that the removal of one or
two books would not rise to the level of a withdrawal of the privilege,
the Sixth Circuit seemed to suggest two answers. First, an order
removing books from school facilities was a much more serious bur-
den on class discussion than an order restricting the wearing of politi-
cal armbands, which had previously been declared unconstitutional
by the Supreme Court. 3 If there was insufficient justification for that
burden, apparently the present burden on class discussion could not
be supported either. Second, the absolute impact of the restraint was
itself irrelevant. The books may have been available to students from
sources beyond the school, but that circumstance did not alter the
fact that access to school resources had been restricted. This conten-
tion was amply supported by prior cases holding that the exercise of
first amendment rights could not be abridged at certain times or
places merely because they could have been exercised equally well at
other times or places. 4 If the right to know does enjoy first amend-
" The doctrine of unconstitutional conditions provides that a state may not condi-
tion the enjoyment of a privilege or benefit upon the surrender of a constitutional right.
The doctrine essentially declares that the state cannot do indirectly what it is not
allowed to do directly, that is, coerce a citizen into surrendering a constitutional right.
See Van Alstyne, The Demise of the Right-Privilege Distipction In Constitutional Law,
81 HARV. L. REV. 1439, 1445-49 (1968).
52 Stated conversely, the doctrine of unconstitutional conditions may mean that
a privilege, once extended, may not be withdrawn without constitutionally justifiable
reasons. On the Minarcini facts, the Sixth Circuit found that the School Board essen-
tially withdrew the privilege, see text accompanying notes 53-55 infra, for reasons of
its own social tastes. These reasons were not constitutionally justifiable. 541 F.2d at
582.
1 Id. In Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School Dist., 393 U.S. 503
(1969), three high school students were suspended for wearing black armbands in
protest of the American war effort in Vietnam. The Supreme Court held that "First
Amendment rights, applied in light of the special characteristics of the school environ-
ment, are available to teachers and students." Id. at 506. Since the wearing of the
armbands was not disruptive of class order, and did not impinge upon the rights of
others, the activity fit within the strictures of that special environment and was pro-
tected by first amendment freedom of speech.
1 Recently, the Supreme Court stated in Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Vir-
ginia Citizens Consumer Coun., Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 757-58 n.15 (1976), that "wle are
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ment protection, it may not be restricted "on the plea that it may be
exercised in some other place.
' 5
Thus the Sixth Circuit's concept of the right to know is apparently
more than a grant of standing, but less than a full affirmative right.
While the scope of the interest has been somewhat vaguely defined,"
there remain other undefined elements of the right to know. For
example, it is unclear whether the right to receive information is a
guarantee of a specific clause in the Bill of Rights, 57 or is a penumbral
right" emanating from the Bill of Rights as a whole.59 Alternatively,
the right to know may arise from a broader theory of the first amend-
ment, one which protects free expression as a means of achieving
important societal values." Neither the Sixth Circuit in Minarcini
aware of no general principle that freedom of speech may be abridged when the
speaker's listeners could come by his message by some other means. . . . Nor have
we recognized any such limitation on the independent right of the listener to receive
the information sought to be communicated." See, e.g., Southeastern Promotions, Ltd.
v. Conrad, 420 U.S. 546, 556 (1975) ("Even if a privately owned forum had been
available, that fact alone would not justify an otherwise impermissible prior restraint.
Thus, it does not matter for purposes of this case that the board's decision might not
have had the effect of total suppression of the musical in the community."); Spence
v. Washington, 418 U.S. 405, 411 n.4 (1974) (Court summarily rejected the view that
the "inhibition of appellant's freedom of expression [is] 'miniscule and trifling' be-
cause there are 'thousands of other means available to'[him] for the dissemination of
his personal views. .. .' "); Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147 (1939) (municipal ordi-
nances banning distribution of handbills along streets or sidewalks not validated be-
cause distribution may be undertaken elsewhere).
Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147, 163 (1939).
See cases cited note 44 supra.
'7 The right to know may arise under the first amendment speech clause, see Van
Alstyne, Political Speakers At State Universities: Some Constitutional Considerations,
111 U. PA. L. REv. 328, 331-32 (1963); the press clause, see Henkin, The Right To Know
And The Duty To Withhold: The Case Of The Pentagon Papers, 120 U. PA. L. REv.
271 (1971); or the petition and assembly clauses, see Steel, note 45 supra.
The Supreme Court stated in Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 484 (1965),
that "specific guarantees in the Bill of Rights have penumbras, formed by emanations
from those guarantees that help give them life and substance."
51 The right of privacy arose from a number of specific guarantees contained in
the Bill of Rights. Among these were the first amendment right of association, the third
amendment prohibition of quartering soldiers in houses without the consent of the
owner, the fourth amendment in its entirety, the self-incrimination clause of the fifth
amendment, and the ninth amendment. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 484
(1965). See also Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179 (1973); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973);
Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972). In the same fashion, the right to know might
arise from the first amendment guarantees of speech, press, and petition, as well as
other constitutional interests such as the right to vote. See text accompanying note 68
infra. The right to receive information is vital to all of these rights.
61 See T. EMERSON, THE SYSTEM OF FREEDOM OF ExPRESSION 593-626 (1970); T.
EMERSON, TOWARD A GENERAL THEORY OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT (1966). Professor Emer-
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nor any other court has grounded this asserted right in the text of the
Constitution, other than to allude vaguely to the first amendment.
One of the more important limiting factors may be the areas to
which this asserted right extends. Boundaries may be drawn by ask-
ing what information a person has a right to receive. The Sixth Cir-
cuit was careful to point out that "we are concerned with the right of
students to receive information which they and their teachers desire
them to have."'" The case involved a right to particular information
designated for known recipients," which is a more limited situation
than a claim for information not specifically addressed to any one
person or group. Support for this restraining consideration may be
analogized from the association cases," where organizations pre-
served a right of association to advance certain causes and to secure
their right of access to particular information. 4 However, this inter-
son states that the system of freedom of expression has, at its core, "a group of rights
assured to individual members of the society." This group of rights achieves and
preserves four values and functions of society. Freedom of expression is a means of
assuring individual self-fulfillment, a process for advancing knowledge and discovering
truth, a way of providing for participation in decisionmaking by all members of society,
and a method of achieving a more adaptable, and hence a more stable, community.
THE SYSTEM OF FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION, supra, at 3-9.
541 F.2d at 583.
£2 A number of the cases relied upon by the Sixth Circuit to support the right to
know were of a limited nature, involving specific information for designated addres-
sees. See Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396 (1974) (right of addressees of mail sent
by prisoners); Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753 (1972) (right of listeners to hear
lectures of invited speaker); Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557 (1969) (right of citizen
to read material he possessed); Lamont v. Postmaster Gen., 381 U.S. 301 (1965) (right
of addressee to receive foreign communist propaganda mailings); Thomas v. Collins,
323 U.S. 516 (1945) (right of workers to hear union organiiing appeal). But see Red
Lion Broadcasting Co. v. Federal Communications Comm'n, 395 U.S. 367 (1969) (right
of public to receive access to general social, political, and moral ideas); Martin v. City
of Struthers, 319 U.S. 141 (1943) (right of citizen to receive advertising literature
distributed door-to-door).
'3 The association cases upheld the right of citizens to associate to achieve desired
goals, protected by broad first amendment guarantees of speech, assembly, and peti-
tion. See cases cited note 64 infra.
" See United Transp. Union v. State Bar, 401 U.S. 576, 585 (1971) ("collective
activity undertaken to obtain meaningful access to the courts is a fundamental right
within the protection of the First Amendment"); UMW Dist. 12 v. Illinois State Bar
Ass'n, 389 U.S. 217 (1967) (first amendment protects program where union employs
salaried attorney to represent any of its members on workmen's compensation claims);
Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen v. Virginia State Bar, 377 U.S. 1 (1964) (first amend-
ment protects union program to advise members of need for legal assistance and to
recommend specific attorneys); N.A.A.C.P. v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 428 (1963) (right
to "associate for the purpose of assisting persons who seek legal redress for infringe-
ments of their constitutionally guaranteed and other rights"). The analogy from these
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pretation is not clear, for several of the cases cited by the Sixth
Circuit concerned a right to receive general information.' For in-
stance, Virginia State Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Con-
sumer Council, Inc., 11 upon which the court of appeals placed primary
emphasis, rested upon the right of consumers to know the generalized
price information that pharmacists might wish to advertise to the
public.
The theoretical basis of the right to know may influence the deter-
mination of what material falls within the reach of the right. If the
right to know is predicated on a relatively narrow political justifica-
tion of the first amendment,"7 its reach may be more circumscribed.
Under this theory the right to speak and to know is a means to insure
that the general populace, which controls the government, will be
well and fully informed. 8 However, deriving the right from the politi-
cal theory of the first amendment may lead to content-based criteria
to determine when one is protected by the right. 9
cases seems particularly appropriate in view of the textual basis for the right of associa-
tion. This right, like the right of privacy, arises from several constitutional guarantees,
among which are the rights of petition, assembly, and speech. See Brotherhood of R.
R. Trainmen v. Virginia State Bar, 377 U.S. 1 (1964). The right to know may be
similarly drawn from several constitutional guarantees. See note 57 supra.
Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Coun., Inc., 425
U.S. 748 (1976) (right of consumer to receive general drug price information); Red Lion
Broadcasting Co. v. Federal Communications Comm'n, 395 U.S. 367 (1969) (right of
public to receive access to general social, political, and moral ideas); Martin v. City
of Struthers, 319 U.S. 141 (1943) (right of citizen to receive advertising literature
distributed door-to-door).
" 425 U.S. 748 (1976). For a discussion of the commercial speech doctrine in this
case, see The Supreme Court, 1975 Term, 90 HARV. L. REv. 56, 142 (1976); Note, The
Demise Of The Commercial Speech Doctrine And The Regulation Of Professional's
Advertising: The Virginia Pharmacy Case, 34 WASH. & LEE L. Rav. 245 (1976).
11 See Steel, note 45 supra. A political foundation for the first amendment was
expressed by James Madison, when he stated that:
A popular Government, without popular information, or the
means of acquiring it, is but a Prologue to a Farce or a Tragedy; or,
perhaps both. Knowledge will forever govern ignorance. And a people
who mean to be their own governors, must arm themselves with the
power knowledge gives.
Letter from James Madison to W. T. Barry, August 4, 1822, in 9 WRITINGS OF JAMES
MADISON 103 (G. Hunt ed. 1910).
"5 Steel, supra note 45, at 314. This political end of seeking an enlightened electo-
rate is similar to the rationale of value-inculcative secondary education. The values
preferred by the community are taught to facilitate the student's entry into the in-
formed, adult electorate. See text accompanying notes 29-31 supra.
61 For example, one commentator suggested several criteria, one of which was
"[thai the speaker must be disccussing public figures, public issues, or other matters
of social importance." Steel, supra note 45, at 341.
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More likely, the right to know should be placed on the market-
place of ideas rationale of the first amendment." The trend of the
Supreme Court has been to adopt this rationale generally,7' and the
right to know already has been specifically based upon promotion of
the competition of ideas. 2 In Minarcini, the Sixth Circuit clearly
adopted the marketplace concept, noting that the library was a valu-
able "resource in the free marketplace of ideas."7 Under this more
open theory of the first amendment, a person would have the right
to know or receive any idea, regardless of its merit or its relation to
the end of informed self-government.
Another unresolved aspect of the right to know concept is the
The marketplace concept was first expressed by Mr. Justice Holmes in 1919
when he wrote that "the ultimate good desired is better reached by free trade in ideas-
. ..the best test of truth is the power of the thought to get itself accepted in the
competition of the market .. " Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919)
(Holmes, J., dissenting). Therefore a free trade of all ideas is to be promoted, not
merely for the political end of informed self-government, but for the general social
value of an enlightened and open society. See cases cited note 71 infra. Ideas would
not be protected because of their relation to self-government, but simply because open
discussion of ideas is thought to promote the general welfare.
"' See, e.g., Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. Federal Communications Comm'n, 395
U.S. 367, 390 (1969) ("It is the purpose of the First Amendment to preserve an uninhi-
bited marketplace of ideas in which truth will ultimately prevail .. "); Lamont v.
Postmaster Gen., 381 U.S. 301, 308 (1965) (Brennan, J., concurring) ("The dissemina-
tion of ideas can accomplish nothing if otherwise willing addressees are not free to
receive and consider them. It would be a barren marketplace of ideas that had only
sellers and no buyers."); New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964)
("[D]ebate on public issues should be uninhibited, robust, and wide-open .. ");
Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 375-76 (1927), overruled on other grounds, Bran-
denburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969) ("Believing in the power of reason as applied
through public discussion, they [the framers of the Constitution] eschewed silence
coerced by law. ... ).
72 In Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Coun., Inc.,
425 U.S. 748 (1976), the Supreme Court went beyond the political justification of the
first amendment to demonstrate the social value of economically well-informed deci-
sions. The Court seemed to adopt at least the underlying theory of the marketplace
concept. The Court stated that
[t]o this end [intelligent economic decisions], the free flow of com-
mercial information is indispensable [citations omitted]. And if it is
indispensable to the proper allocation of resources in a free-enterprise
system, it is also indispensable to the formation of intelligent opinions
as to how the system ought to be regulated or altered. Therefore, even
if the First Amendment were thought to be primarily an instrument
to enlighten public decisionmaking in a democracy, we could not say
that the free flow of information does not serve that goal.
Id. at 765 (footnotes omitted).
7 541 F.2d at 582.
' See note 70 supra.
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question of who is protected. Obviously the designated recipient
should have access to communications sent particularly to him. "5
Even assuming that the protection extends to undifferentiated recipi-
ents of generalized information, there has been no indication of how
this right may be applied to intermediaries in the information dis-
semination process, such as librarians
7 and booksellers. 77
On the whole, then, the Minarcini court relied on an unsatisfacto-
rily explained right to know. The number of unresolved questions
limits the value of the asserted right to receive information, and
leaves ambiguous those holdings specifically based upon the right.
Closer analysis than has been forthcoming will be required to fix this
right solidly in the Constitution. Courts will have to indicate more
precisely who might be protected by this right, and why they are
deserving of protection, before the meaning and applicability of the
right becomes clear. Until courts make such analyses, the unresolved
questions will outweigh the value of "the right to know."
BRUCE G. PERRONE
75 See text accompanying notes 61-64 supra.
11 One commentator has proposed that librarians should be given derivative pro-
tection to ensure the citizen's right to read and to receive information. See O'Neil,
Libraries, Librarians And First Amendment Freedoms, 4 HUMAN IGHTS 295 (1975);
O'Neil, Libraries, Liberties And The First Amendment, 42 U. CIN. L. REv. 209 (1973).
Professor O'Neil offers two arguments for this protection. First, the reader cannot read
if there is no material available, and the librarian is the principal source of the mate-
rial. Second, a librarian cannot be required to violate the constitutional rights of
readers by withholding materials to which the first amendment ensures them access.
4 HUMAN IJGHTS, supra at 307.
n See Zeitlin v. Arnebergh, 59 Cal.2d 901, 383 P.2d 152, 31 Cal. Rptr. 800 (1963).
In Zeitlin the California Supreme Court, granting standing to both the bookseller and
the buyer, struck down a ban on Henry Miller's Tropic of Cancer. While it is true that
the bookseller has traditionally been protected by his role in preserving the speaker's
right to disseminate information, it would seem that, if the right to know were applied
to this situation, the bookseller could derive the same kind of protection for his role in
preserving the reader's right to receive such information.
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